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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BULLFROG MARINA, INC.
\
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
GILBERT M. LENTZ,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.

12503

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Suit for failure to perform the remaining term of a twoyear Houseboat Lease Agreement and for amounts properly
due under an Employment Contract and for Costs.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The cause was tried to the Court before the Honorable

1

Edward Sheya, Judge. The Court entered Judgment in favor
of Plaintiff/ Appellant for an amount •the Court determined
due under the Employment Contract, denied Plaintiff/
Appellant recovery under the Lease Agreement and denied
the Defendant/Respondent recovery on his counterclaim.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/ Appellant seeks to reverse the Judgment of the
District Court on determination of no damages for breach of
the Lease Agreement for allowance of Attorney's fees and
seeks additional recovery under the Employment Contract.
The Defendant/Respondent seeks to reverse the Judgment of
the District Court on the award of damages from the Em·
ployment Contract.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff/ Appellant, Bullfrog Marina, Inc. ("Bullfrog" hereafter) is a concessionaire of the National Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior for exclusive right of operation of tourist facilities at Bullfrog Basin
on Lake Powell in San Juan County, Utah.

In 1969 Bullfrog determined to provide houseboat
rentals as part of the services to the public. For that purpose
Bullfrog acquired three rental houseboats to be placed in the
marina on Lake Powell. The boats were delivered to the Lake
in March and April, 1969 (Dumke deposition, p. 24) (T-199).
The general boating season on Lake Powell commences
m March and runs through the middle of October of each
2

year (T-135 ). (References to transcript, "T," are to page
numbers of the abstracted transcript.)
Bullfrog wanted an employee to manage the houseboat
rental division of the marina operations. The Defendant/
Respondent, Gilbert M. Lentz, ("Lentz" hereafter) living in
California, was interested in running a houseboat rental business on Lake Powell during the boating season and learned of
Bullfrog's plans.
Preliminary Negotiations
In April, 1969, Lentz made two telephone calls to Bullfrog's main offices in Salt Lake City, Utah, to discuss the
possibility of managing the houseboat operations on Lake
Powell (T-144 ). Later in April and May, 1969, Lentz visited
the offices in Salt Lake City and had extensive discussions on
houseboat operations (T-144-145 ).
The parties concluded that a successful houseboat rental
operation would require six houseboats.
The parties orally agreed that Lentz would become the
employee of Bullfrog and be the manager of the houseboat
operation (T-17, 18). In addition, it was agreed that Lentz
would purchase three more houseboats and lease them to
Bullfrog so that six houseboats would be available to the
houseboat division.
Lentz commenced employment on May 19, 1969, renting the houseboats provided by Bullfrog to the public and

3

managmg the houseboat division of Bullfrog Marina (T-16).

The houseboats purchased by Lentz were delivered to
the Lake in June and July, and these three boats as part of
Bullfrog operations were incorporated into the houseboat
operation (T- 7).

1

1

Written Agreements and Execution
Both parties wanted written contracts to cover their oral
agreements and Bullfrog requested its attorneys to preparr
two contracts. The agreements, one denominated an Emplovrncnt Contract and the other a Lease Agreement, were pw
pared and subrnitlt>d lo Lentz for approval. They were reviewed, rejected and after extensive notes, were returned to
Bullfrog (T-20, 21 ). Based on the first
and the obje1'tions of
the second drafts of the agreements \1m
prepared by the attorneys and delivere<l to E. R_ Dumke, an
officer of Bullfrog, for dt>livery to Lentz. In Jul), 196 1), \Ir.
Dumke flew the contracts to Lakt· Powell where they wm
again reviewed by Mr. Lentz (T-24).

1

The revised contracts did not fully reflect the desires of
Lentz and, therefore, at Lake Powell were modified by hand
interlineation and exclusion. Each such change was initialed
by Mr. Dumke and Lentz (T-17, 18, 20, 21, Appendix B,
Appendix C).
The contracts were not executed at that time, it being
contemplated that they would be retyped (T-16, 17, 18).
On about July 31, 1969, Mr. Lentz met Mr. Dumke at
Lake Powell in the presence of a Mr. Clair Boyle, the then

4

'

manager of the over-all Bullfrog marina operation. The meeting was in the trailer office of Bullfrog Marina and the Em•
p1oyment (,ontract was executed
lqly 31, 1969, and
inserting the effective date of the Contract as of May 19,
1969 (T-17, Appendix C).
The Lease Agreement was not executed on July 31,
1969, and both parties agree that the agreement was executt'd at a subsequent time. Mr. Lentz contends the execution was on October 10, 1969 (T-21). Mr. Dumke claims an
execution <late of around August 19, 1969. The Lease Agreement has an agreed effective date of May 31, 1969. (Appendix B).
Performance Under Employment Contract
Bullfrog and Lentz had been operating under an oral
employment agreement and lease which were substantially
the same as the written agreements (T-17, 20).
Lentz continued his employment through the boating
season of 1969.
The Employment Contract required Lentz to keep
books and furnish Bullfrog accountings of the houseboat
operations on a quarterly basis. He kept no books and gave
delayed accounting on a monthly basis. The accountings for
\lay and June were rendered in August, 1969; the July accounting was rendered at the end of August, 1969; the
August and September accountings were rendered at the end
of October, 1969; and the remaining months of account and
final accounting were not rendered until after this action was
commenced (T-164).
The Employment Contract specifically provides for the

5

distribution of thf' receipts and chargeable costs and expenses
of the houseboat operation (Appendix C, Exhibit 6). Mr.
Lentz used his own theory• and st)rlt: of accountino-!::'' io-norina
'I:'
t
certain cost deduction provisions of tht: contract and construing himself as an independent business operation (T-118,
121). At trial Lentz admitted that he was an employee of
Bullfrog and both the accountant witnesses for Plaintiff and
Dependant testified his contract and actions show that he
was an employee of Bullfrog (T-11, 12, 27.S, 276).
During his employment at the \larina during the boating
season, Lentz devoted some 25 to 35 hours per week in 4 tu
S <lays per week to the management of the houseboat division. At times when Lentz' services were needefl and he was
not at the Lake, other employees of Bullfrog would perform
tht: services and work at no accountable charge to the house·
boat division (T-137).
Lentz was advanced the sum of $600.00 per month ad·
vanced against commissions due to cover minimum wages.
Social Security, withholding tax and other deductions were
taken from the advances. Each check advance<l to Lentz was
endorsed by him and deposited to his personal or business
account at his residence in California, except for the final
check, which was endorsed for cash at the l\larina (Exhibit

7).
Lentz Not Resident of Utah
After the boating season Lentz left Bullfrog on or about
October 15, l 969, and traveled extensively in the western
United States and i\lexico, returning to his home in Fillmore,
California, in November, 1969 (T-53, 54).
Lentz returned lo Lake Powell between November lS

6

and 23, 1969, and without advising his employer, he removed
the three houseboats under lease to Bullfrog from the moorings at the Bullfrog Marina and transported the houseboats
aeross Lake Powell and moored them at Hall's Crossing
(T-52).
The houseboats removed had been supplied and
equipped at the expense of Bullfrog (Exhibit 26, T-176(a),
(b)) and the supplies and equipment remained in the houseboats when they were removed to Hall's Crossing (R-69-81).
Lentz then returned to his residence in Fillmore, California, and from there furnished Bullfrog a letter notifying
it that he was utilaterally terminating both the Employment
Contract and the Lease Agreement. The letter was dated
November 28, 1969 (T-53, Exhibit 11).
Lentz lists his permanent address as Fillmore, California,
and all correspondence and telephone communications from
the termination of his employment and March, 1970, were
directed to or from such residence address (T-54 ).
Neither housetrailer owned by Lentz was registered in
the State of Utah during 1969, although they were positioned at Bullfrog Basin. Lentz took one trailer during his
tours and travels after leaving the Marina in October and the
trailer that remained at Bullfrog was not occupied by Lentz
or any of his family after October 15, 1969 (T-55).
Lentz owned two cars and a truck, all registered in the
State of California at all times pertinent, through and including the month of February, 1970 (T-55).
Lentz testified that he had no intention to return to

7

Bullfrog or conduct any business at Bullfrog Basin subsequent to October 1.5, 1969_
Lentz inserted advertisements in "Sunset Magazine," advertising houseboat rental availability on Lake Powell and
specifying his return mailing address for such rentals as Fillmore, California, or Page, Arizona (T-1.5.5-1.58) (Exhibits 19,
20,21)Lentz visited Hall's Crossing two or three times between
October, 1969, and March, 1970, without notice to Bullfrog,
to check on the condition of his houseboats and/or receive
rentals or reservation deposits therefor and at no time during
the month of February, 1970, did the Defendant own or
inhabit a trailer or other residential accommodation at Hall's
Crossing, lJ tah (T-66 ).
Lentz operated under a California driver's license and
did not acquire a Utah driver's license until March 30, 1970
(T-.5 7).
Lentz' children lived at his residence in Fillmore, California, and he specifically resided there in February, 1970
(T-.54 ).
Lentz reported on his Utah State Income Tax Return
that he was not a resident of Utah and reported his residence
to Le California (T-79, 80, 81)- Lentz testified that his California State Income Tax Return designated the State of California as his residence.
Bullfrog filed on Affidavit for
Lentz was not a resident of Utah (R-26, 46).

alleging that

Bullfrog obtained issuance of a Writ of Attachment on

February 18, 1970, which was served upon the houseboats at
Hall's Crossing, San Juan County, Utah, on February 19,
1')70, Bullfrog obtained issuance of another Writ of Attachmrnt dated February 19, 1970, which was served by the
Kane County Sheriff and levied upon the trailer at Bullfrog
\larina on February 27, 1970 (R-82, 84).
The San Juan County Sheriff received a Summons on
Fdm1ary 20, 1970, for service upon Gilbert M. Lentz. Lentz
appeared at the Sheriff's office in San Juan County on March
2, I <no, and accepted service of Summons after he knew the
at lachments had been levied and after he was mailed a copy
of the summons pursuant to the Court's Order of publication
of Htmrnons (R-18, 65, 65A).

\t the end of the 1969 boating season, Lentz continued
to advc-rtise for houseboat rentals from Hall's Crossing and in
rompctition to Bullfrog.
1

Use of Boats Removed and Lost Rentals
Lentz obtained substantial reservations for the 1970 season, requiring $100 each advance reservation deposit and at
time of trial had almost completely filled the reservations for
all boats he owned for the entire 1970 season (T-209, 210).
Bullfrog also continued to advertise for houseboat reservation and rentals and obtained substantial requests relying
on the use of all houseboats, including the three leased from
Lentz. When Lentz refused to perform the lease for the 1970
season Bullfrog had to refuse rentals to numerous prospective
customers and rearrange or cancel existing reservations
(T-138, 172, 174).

9

Many of lht' rescrvations for I <)7() obtained by Lentz
were received during the I 9(>9-70 winter and man) resnvations were made by persons believing they were .renting a
houseboat al Bullfrog Basin frorn Bullfrog \larina, Inc.
(T-211, 212, 215, 216, 22B). i\lrs. Lentz testified that many
customers, who were actually n1::;tomcrs of Bullfrog. weft'
not told until just prior to their appearance at the Lake that
their reservations were to be with Lentz at Hall's Crossin"
(T-222, 223). To Bullfrog's knowlcdgt·, only one ('[!stonwr
was given the opportunity to rescind his reservation. \Jn;.
Lentz testified that there was confusion by many of the cus
tomers hut they had no intention of rdurning the rcsn\alions to Bullfrog (T-216. 217).

The houseboats fttrnislwd by each of the parties for w;c
at Lake Powt·ll had only the boats, motor:-; and propanr
tanks. The living ('11uipment and supplies were all purcha,;l'd
and placed 011 the boats by Bullfrog to lw used by the rnstomers. A substantial portion of the itl'lllS \\ere takrn In
Lentz at the time he rt'rnoved his boah lo Hall's Crossing in
November, 1969. and Wt'rt' not returned until ordl'rt'd by the
Court and substantial amounts of equipment were unaccounted for and not returned (Exhibit 26). The Court determined the value of $1,000.00 for the convntcd items but did
not award any damagt'S for the conversion.
ARGUi\IENT
POINT I

PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO COSTS INCURRED
IN TllE ISSll \NCE OF
All of the physi('al fads addll('t'd in this cast' indicate that
was not a resident of lJ Lah at the time the attachment
issued (to wit: February, 1970). lie filed his income tax returns for the year in <\llCE'tio11 in California
thal

JO

State as his residence. His Utah State income tax returns were
filed on a non-resident basis indicating his place of residence
as California. All of the Defendant's vehicles and trailers were
registered in California and he did not acquire a Utah driver's
license until March 30, 1970. The Defendant maintained a
home in California and his children resided in that home. At
the time of the filing of the complaint and issuance of summons and attachments in February, 1970, the Defendant, by
his own testimony, was outside of the State of Utah, and had
been since October, 1970.
The Plaintiff had no other means to obtain jurisdiction
over the Defendant and the subject of this action other than
the issuance of the attachment against a non-resident Defendant. After the attachment and mailing a copy of summons
to be served upon the Defendant in California, the Defendant
attended the State of Utah and thereupon personally accepted service of Summons.
The only evidence that might support the finding that
the Defendant was a resident of the State of Utah are the
facts that the Defendant, during the prior summer, managed
the houseboat division of Bullfrog Marina at Bullfrog, Utah,
maintammg sleeping accommodations in a California
registered trailer parked at Bullfrog and his testimony that it
was his intention to be a resident of the State of Utah.
The Defendant's oral testimony of his intention to be a
Utah resident is contradicted by the fact that the income tax
returns were filed several months after the service of
rnent and at the Lime of filing such returns, the Defendant
claimed to be a resident of the State of California. Further,
he did not register any vehicle or obtain Utah driver's license
until two months after the attachment.

11

The Defendant had converted three of Bullfrog's house
boats and was not within the State of lltah at the time of
commencement of the action and issuance of attad1rnenb.
Under the facts of this case and with the fast-<ipproaching
boating season, it is not reasonable to assume that
must await the Defendant's pleasure anrl return to the
of Utah before commencing action to recover its possci'son
interest in the houseboats and for damages.
The costs incurred in issuing the attachment service anrl
taking possession of the subject of the action are subst<intial.
as itemized in Plaintiff's cost bill, as follows:
Clerk's Fees:

Cost of Attachment
Attachment Bond

Sheriff's Fees: Attachment of Trailer, Kane County
Attachment of boats and equipment
Hall's Crossing, San Juan County
Storage cost to Hall's Crossing
Marina during attachment
Total:

$

2..JO
100.0IJ

49.60
48.70

120.00
$320.80

The above-outlined costs were disallowed by the District
Court (R-154) and in view of the facts of this r-ase11w<is an
error in the law and equitably unfair.
.su.c.\-\ r1.1.l; 11 S
The Court found that Lentz was a resident of the State
of Utah at the time of issuance and service of attachmrnt'
when, in fact, he was a Domicile of the State of California.
and at the time of issuance of the attachment was not within
the territorial limits of the State of ll tah and claimed n·,idency in the State of California.
12

is a factual place of abode which can be
either a temporary or permanent place of abode and a person
1·a11 have more than one such residence. On the other hand a
domicile is a permanent home or abode where one lives or if
on a l<'mporary sojourn is the permanently fixed place where
there is an
to ultimately return. Jarrell vs. Leeper, 9
2d. 788 (Arkansas, 1928).
1
\

For a valid attachment as a nonresident the person must
lw a nonresident of the state and maintain no abode where
service of process can be made. The Court then obtains jurisdiction of the property of the Defendant. Bristol vs. Brent,
litah 108, 103 P. 1076, 1079, (1909).
for attachments purposes is not the domicile
of a person " ... but an actual place of abode, permanent or
lt'rnporary, at which the service of process may be lawfully
made." A person absent from this state, either as his state of
domicile or temporarily residing elsewhere, then becomes a
1wn-resident. Salm vs. Krieg, 49 N.Y.S. 649, (New York,
1944).
The residence requires bodily presence at an actual place
of abode where service of process can be made. Loew 's, Inc.
vs. Dorsey, 97 N.Y.S. 315, (New York, 1950).
Persons often change domicile and residency in relation
lo business. Courts have determined each case on their facts
and have held that the creditor need not wait for a nonresident to enter the state although knowing that the party
frequently may do so. The time when the writ .is issued and
utilized is the time at which the question of residency is
material. The residence must be a place of abode within the
slate at which process can be lawfully served. If the party is
not available for such process, he is a nonresident and attach13

mcnt may issue. Augustus Co. vs ..l11111zel/11, 17 A.2d. 68.
(New Jersey, 1940). Clarke vs. f>atton, 16 Su. 2d. 585.
(Louisiana, 1944). Sec also I> 'Elia &· \larks Co., Inc. v.1.
Lyon, 31 A. 2d, 647, (District of Columbia, I
Also see
Bonds
Ross, 7 So. 2<l. 5.54, (Mississippi, 1942).
Lentz had no contacts with the State of Utah prior tu
his employment by Bullfrog at Lake Powell. I-le maintained
minimal contact with the State during his employment at the
Lake, paying nonresident Utah income tax and not paying
other fees or acquiring other licenses, even though they 11131
have been required by lltah Law. During his cmployrnent.
Lentz' domicile was the State of California, where he had his
permanent abode and wlwre he maintained his childn'.n and
his other businesses. After the boating season his temporary
residency within the State of Utah ceased and he again rrturned to his domicile and residence in the State of Californ1a.
After the end of the 1969 boating season Lentz'
contact with the State of Utah was his reversionary intere:;ts
in the leased houseboats. By his own testimony. Lentz stated
that he did not intend lo return to Bullfrog and visited the
state only sporadically without notifying anyone of his intention (T-50, 52, 53, 54).
Bullfrog was not required to prove that Lent,., was, in
fact, a resident or a domicile of some other state hut only
that he was a nonresi<knt of the State of Utah at the time of
service of the Attachment. Salm vs. Krieg, supra; Agustus
Company us. M1111zcl/11. wpm; and Jarrell vs. Leeper, ,,upm.
(Please refer to Appendix A for extracts of cases)
At tilt' time of the issuance of Summons and Complaint
and Attacl11m:nt and service of the 1\ttachment, Lentz had no
14

fixed or
temporary place of abode at which service of
process could have been made and that at such time was a
nonresident of the State of lJ tah, having established residence
and domicile elsewhere. Plaintiff's costs incurred in the
attachment proceedings should be assessed against the Defendant.

POINT II
TllE IIOlJSEBOAT LEASE AGREEMENT IS A CLEAR

\

DEFI'.'llTE AGREEl\IENT WITH NEITHER VAGlJE
Ai\IBIGliOllS PROVISIONS AND BlJLLFROG WAS
E\TITLED TO POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT HOUSEBO \TS FOR THE FULL TERM OF THE LEASE OR FOR
ll \:\L\GES FOR CONVERSION OF ITS POSSESSORY

The District Court, in essence, ignored the form and
rnnlt'xt of two separate agreements and found that the Employment Contract on one hand and the Lease Agreement on
the other were only one mutually dependent and interrelated agreement (Findings of Fact 45, 46, 47 and R-136).
In order to accomplish this result the Court disregarded
the separate contract negotiations, the separate agreements
with different dates of actual execution, modified the terms
ol' the houseboat agreement from a two-year term to a term
eancellable on 14-day notice, and eliminated the provision
for attorney's fees.
For convenience and easy reference the Employment
Contract has been reproduced and attached as Appendix C
and the Lease Agreement is similarly attached to this Brief as
\pprndix B.
).')

Such findings of the Court are completely at odds with
the facts adduced in this case. All of the evidence indicafrs
that each of the agreements was separately negotiated, executed at separate times and subject to different considerations.
The only common element of the Employment Contract and Lease Agreement is that they are between the same
parties!
The differences between the agreements are manyfold
with the primary differences as follows:
1. The Employment Contract requires a personal
service and personality compatibility between employer
and employee.
2. The termination of the Employment Contract
on short notice would not effect Bullfrog's ability to
supply physical facilities (houseboats) to customers.
3. Each of the contracts was separately negotiated
and executed at substantially different times.
a. The Employment Contract was executed at
Bullfrog on or about July 31, 1969 (T-1 7).
b. The Lease Agreement was executed on either
August 19 or October ] 0, 1969 (T-21 ).
c. The agreed effective date or date of cummenccment of the Employment Contract wa;; July 81. 1969,
with employment payments to corrwierzcc May 19.
1969 (Appendix C).

16

d. The agreed effective date or date of commencement of the Leas<: Agrennent was May 31, 1969
(:\ppcndix B).
e. Stthsequrnt to the execution of the Employment Contract, additional modifications were made in
the Lease A.grccment hefon· the same was executed.
4. Considnalion to Lentz from the houseboat
Lease Agreement was computed on the basis of gross
rentals.
S. The wage paid to Lentz under the Employment
Contract was dependent on his personal ability as
manager and was framed to provide incentive to the
manager payable out of rzct profits.
6. The Lease Agreement has a proVIswn for
\ttorncy's fees on default whereas the Employment
Contract has no similar provision.
The fact that both contracts were twice drafted by the
al torneys, thereafter substantially altered and amended by
i11krlincation and exclusion before their execution, and that
I lw parties initialed and ratified each modification or exclusion lends validity to the contracts and indicates that the
parties were not confused by the terms, but in fact had considned carefully each term and condition of the contracts.
The conduct indicates that the contracts were executed only
aftn difficult and extensive long-term negotiations, wherein
each term and condition was developed. We respectfully draw
Iii(' Court's attention to the copies of the contracts attached
\ ppcndix B & C: and the fact that almost every _provision
or term of eaeh contract has been altered by the parties to
rnrrectly reflect their intention.
The parties had substantial and protracted negotiations
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before the 1969 boating season. L<'ntz lcas('d his bo<ils to
l311llfrog virtually the cntir<' I WJ') ;-;easoll under an oral lca:,P,
When he signed th(' agrcnnent fi\(· davs
lwfore lc<ivi1wt' thi·
•
Lakt-'. for the end of the season. Lentz ;;lated that lw wanted a
writtt'll Lease Agrt-'.t'ment exccu led before lw ldt the L<iki·
(T-20, 21 ).
The substantial interlining and d1anging the provision,;
of the typed contract reflt•t·! the llcgotiations nt•ccss<iry to
develop a rrnd11al mectillg of the lllinds oil final written agrccmcllts. Tlw intnlillt'alions were made Oil several diffnent
occasions durillg '.lw s11m11wr. :-;uch deliberation and intnlineation and final execution of the agreements lcllds full
credence and weight lo the fad that the agreement, as illter·
lined, was the time tested final agreement of the partic,;
which should be enl'or('(:d by the Courl.
Wlwn· prm
have been specifically written into a
printed or typed agn·t·mcnt. such provision:; ;-;hould be given
partirnlar attention alld special weight. Hickey vs. /)irks, 156
Kan. 326, 133 P. 2d. I 07, ( 194:3). fiansrnme vs. Copplllger,
Kan. 62:3, 331 P.2d. S9 l, ( l 9:JH).
This Court in Jlolland vs. Hron·n, IS Lilah 2d. 422, 394
P.2d. 77, ( 1964) held: "WhtTt' there is a printed form of
contract and other words art· inserted in writing or otherwise,
it is to he assumed that they take precedence over the printrd
matter." SP-!-'. also Baum l'S. National Final!('<! Company, I OB
Colo. 93, 114 P. 2d ..560, (1941) and Hurn., vs. Pet<'r.,, SC.2d.
619,.5.5P.2d. llH2, llH-t,(1936).
The oral arrangements, contracts and agreements are
merged into the final written Lease Agreement. This Court
has lwld in Youngr<'n us. }oltn W. Lloyd Construction <:ompany, Inc., 22 litah 2d. 207, 4SO P. 2d. 9BS, ( 1969) at pagr
IH

'187:
'"When parties have negotiated on a subject and have
thereafter entered into a written contract, it should be
assumed that their prior negotiations are fused into the
contract so that it represents their full agreement with
re sped thereto; and that consequently, after its due exe<;u tion, extraneous evidence should ordinarily not be be
permitted to add to, subtract from, vary or contradict
it."
See also l\Jawhinney vs. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P.
2d., 769, 774, (1951) and Halloran - Judge Trust Co. vs.
lfe11th, 70 Utah 124, 258 P. 342, 346, (1927).
!\!though
Judge at T-241 correctly stated the
rule of law that • oral agreements and no oral testimony
would be used to vary its terms, he nevertheless blantently
violates the rule and has modified clear and unambiguous
provisions to accommodate his version of a fair result. The
Comt ignored the written agreements, substituted therefor its
Judgment and created a new contract. This is not in accordance with Utah law and principles.
In the case of Jensen Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 Utah 2d.
276, 323 P. 2d. 259, ( 1958) this Court, through the Honorable Justice Henriod, clearly enunciated the rules which are
applicable in interpreting this Lease Agreement, pages 260
and 261:
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts we
seek to determine the intentions of the parties. But it is
also elementary and of t'.xtreme practical importance
that we hold rnntracting parties to their clear and
understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by them as signatories thereto. Were
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this not so lrnsincss, one with another among our citizens, would be relegated Lo the chaotic, and the basic
purpose of the law Lo supply enforceable rules of conduct for the maintenance and improvement of an
orderly socit>ty's welfare and progress would find itself
impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold one rcsponsililP
for language which he himself espouses. Such language i:o
the only implement he gives us to fashion a determination as lo the intentions of the parties. Under suf'h
circumstances we should not he required tu embosom
any request that we ignore that very language. This is a;;
it should be. The rule excluding matters outside the four
corners of a clear, understandable document, is a fair
one, and one's contentions concerning his intent should
extend no further than hi:; own clear exprt'.ssions.''

"It was urged correctly that Lo admit matters outside a contract would du violence to the principle that
one is bound bv his manifestations of asst·nt, and that,
irrespective of
contention, such matters properly
are excludablc by the parol evidence rnk, - which rule,
counsel suggests, is one of substantive law rather than
one of evidence. "\\'hatever kind one calls it, the rule that
excludes such evidence is a common sense rule."

s.2:izr,

In H11i11ford l''· f<yltirzg. 22 Utah 2d.
P. 2d.
269, ( 1969) Chief Justict· Callister i11 a per rnriam decision
stale,; on page 770:
"The rule is well sctllc:d that the parties have redu<'cd to writing what appears to he a complete and
certain a}!:rccrncnt. It will, in the absence of fraud, Lie
co111:lusiv;·ly presumed that the writing contained thr
whole: of Ifie agrt'('lllClll lwtwct•n the parties, that it a
co111plctc 11wrnorial of such agrt'<"llH'llt and that parol
cvidn11:c of co111<'111pora11cous co11vnsations, rcprct'cntations or stalt'11w11ts will not lw n:ccivl'd with the purpose· of va'./ing or adding to the terms of the writtc'n
a<'JTt'lllC:lll.

'"'
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abo (;(lrr<'tl V\. Hllison.
Ltah 184, 72 P. 2d. 449,
(I 'J:\7) for a kngthy di;;cussion of lhc basis for tht· rule; and
a,.. appli<'d in similar t·ascs St't' Fox Film Corporation vs.
Th<'alrc Comp11ny, H2 l1tah 279, 17 P. 2d. 294,
(I 'J:l2) and lJ11vi., vs. /'11yne and Da_y, Inc.. 10 Utah 2d. 53,
:1111 I'. 2d. :ti?. ( 1960) and H. T. Horan. foe. vs. First Secur1/\ <orpnmfion. 82 lltah :n6, 24 P. 2d. 384, 389, (1936).
U;!<l1•11

The Lt·ase \greernent, \ppendix 13, is a clear and defin1l1· a;!r<·t·rnent lictwecn Bullfrog and Lentz, not vague in any
111' ih provision,.. nor docs it contain any ambiguities. The
p<trlic" ('karly understood the terms when the contract was
l'\.tTtllcd. The agnTnwnt cannot then thercafler Le varied by
lilt' oral tc.-timony of Lcnlz or liy the District Judge. The
< '011rl has the d11tv to con:;trne and cnl'orct' the agreement
<1c·1·ordi11;! lo its dt"ar and definite terms.
Tlw Lease \grcemcnt and Employment Contract were
j1rt'pa1Td as lwo :--eparalc agn·emcnts between the Plaintiff
.111d 1lqwndant, and they involved two entirely separate and
di:;find pmposcs. The Employment Contract was, as stated
1111 it,; fact". for the employment of the Defendant and conLtint"d "fl<"t"ific standards for performance. termination provisions and, of t·ottrse, was dependent upon the personality and

'"'l'<Tit'llCt' or Bullfrog and Lentz working together. On the
ollwr hand the Lease .'\grecmcnt was strictly for lease of the
1·q11ipm<'nl for a definite term, a completely separate and
't'\nahlc transaction from the Employment Contraet. None
()f lfw lcrm,; of tlte Lease 1\greemcnt would Le applicaLle to
rlw Employment Contract. The Employment .Contract terms
• 1ndd not he compatibly combined into the Lease Agree111t ·n 1.
The Lease Agreement was for a distincl period of two
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yt'ars with no rights of lnrninatio11. Tlw l\\o-y<'ar fHm·rs1on
was inkrlincd into tlw 1·onlrad 11; Lt'nlz hi111sclf. Lt>trtz
would have the sam<'
profit from llr<' I.cas1· \gn·1·ment wlwtlH'r or not hi'\\ as 1·111plo; I'd b; Bullfrog:.
The Lease Agrc<'mn1t contained :-;1d1stanliall; morl'
interlincation than the Employ rncnl <:onlrad with ,;01111· of
the intnli1H'alion )wing made afltT tlw Ernployrrwnt Conlrad
was execull'd (T-21 ). If tlw parti1·s had intend('(! that the
transactions lw a singl<' agn·1·m1·nt or inlnd1·p1·rnlt-nt thn
could havc w provided.
Ry lt'rminalion. earwcllation and refusal to 1·nforn· thl'
Lea,.,c, the Di,.,trid Court rdu;-;ed lo at'l't'pl th<' agn·1·1111·1tl a'
written and suhs<'rihl'd by the parli<'s and adopll'd and inln1.ioscd tnrns of another agn·1·1111·nl and oral t1·;-;ti111ony into
tht' Lca,.;c Agreement. Thi:-; clearly 1·x1·1·c1b tlw
function and authority.
This Court has rnn:-;isll'nlh held that it rs thl' C:ourl·,
function to rncrcl; eonstrttt' or intnprl'I tire 1·ontral'ls of
parties and not tlw Court's pr<'rogalive lo l':\le111l, nealt'.
modify, alter or amend an; l'onlrad:-; or an; pro\ision:-; tlll'rl'of and further tht' Court l'annol import hod ii; pnl\isio11s of
one agreement into anotlwr agr1·1·ml'nl.
Tire pri ncipl1·s above out lincd an· basi1· hu l nevnl hd1·S'
th<' litah Law supporting these prin<'ipks and other leading
ca:-ws arc l'ollcctcd and reported in 1\pp<'ndix D.
Tlw parties 1·0111 rrn·nced opt'.ra I ion under oral agrcl'nwnts as indicalt'd by the lt'stirnony of both Bullfrog and
Lentz. It is appar<'nl from their 1t'sti111ony that the agrce1111·nh wtTe prt'parcd in vi1'\\ of their 1·x1)('ri1·11t'l' 1111dn !hi'

oral agreements and modified so as to practically accommod<Jtc the opcrnting conditions. The two contracts which are
:;ubjccts of this action could be properly denominated as contracts
in the light of practical experience and res1dting from operational practicalities.
,\ houseboat constitutes a major capital investment, the
rn:-;t thereof being approximately $7,000.00 to $9,000.00 for
each houseboat. (Exhibit 49) It is necessary to obtain reservations and deposits well in advance of the adual operating
st·ason so as to assure that the capital investment will be
employed to the maximum during the relatively short houseboating season on Lake Powell. (T-159, 160)
The b<Jsic minimum rental period is one week. At the
time the Defendant converted the possessory interest in the
houseboat:;, there was a remaining term of 17 months under
lhe Lease Agreement (From
1969, through May,
1971 ). The testimony of both Bullfrog and Lentz indicates
that the primary househoating season involves approximately
the months of April, '\1ay, .I une, July, August and September
and part of October with the heaviest use in the summer
months (T-209-211, Exhibits 8 and 45, T-138, Lentz deposition pp. 77-80).
Bullfrog lost the use of the houseboats for the entire
houseboat season in the year 1970.
'.\I rs. Lentz testified 011 June 4, 1970, that at that time
Lentz hacl 59 reservations weeks reserved for the l 970 season. This is compared to a maximum ·use for the three boats
of 84 reservations weeks as hereafter eornpu lt'd for the season. It is a fair assumption that additional resnvations for the
l 970 season were obtained aftf'r the June 4 trial date and

that the season maximum of 84 reservations would almost
have been reached (T-209-21 l, Exhibit 45).
Mr. Dumke and :Vlr. '.\1allory of the offices of Bullfrog
testified that Bullfrog had had to turn down many customers
for the l 970 season because they were not able to acquire
sufficient boats on short notice (T-138, 172).
The trial court refused to surrender the houseboats to
Bullfrog and at this late date, the reasonable measure of
damages for the conversion is the loss of profit or rentals
from
subject of the contract during the remaining term of
the lease.
The evidence indicates that the average gross rentals re·
ceived from all six houseboats for August, 1969, the moRt
representativt· of that season (Exhibit P-8) were:
Size
of
Houseboats
41-foot
34-foot

Number
of
Boats
3
3

Gross Rental
Received
Therefrom
$6,030.00
$4,485.00

Number
of
Rentals

B

11

Average
Rental
$464.00
$408.00

Some of the rentals for this month were at reduced rates
either for promotional purposes or at rates let to customers
before the final higher tariffs were approved by the National
Park Servit:e (T-23).
llndn the terms of the Lease Lentz was entitled to 40%
of the rentals and the remainder is due lo Bullfrog (Exhibit 5
and Appendix B). Hoth Bullfrog and Ln1tz testified that they
had substantial numbers of rcsnvations weeks for the 1970
boating season (T-209-211) (exhibts 45){!-138, T-172).
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The reservations obtained were only for full weeks and
were at the tariffs approved by the National Park Service of
$495.00 per week for the 41-foot boat and $415.00 per week
for the 34-foot boat (T-23).
Reservations weeks available for the 1970 season were:
\lonths:
March & April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct.
Weeks of Season: 4
4
4
5
4
5
2
These total 28 reservations weeks in the 1970 season.
The evidence for Bullfrog indicates that the subject
houseboats could have been fully employed for the
houseboat season. Therefore, damages should be computed
on tlw basis of full utilization of the subject houseboats durinp; the houseboat season.

Damage may be computed from two basis:
l. The receipts from a month in the prior year wherein
the boats were fully utilized (August) and be projected for
the houseboat season of 1970 or,

2. The receipts can be projected using the National Park
Service approved rates and projecting full utilization.
In the calculation, an average of 25 reservations weeks

si·ason could be used based on the experience of-Bullfrog
(T-138, 172) and Lentz (T-209-211) for the commencement

of the 1970 season which showed slightly less than full utili1.ation for the early months of the 1970 season.
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Damages projected for 25 weeks on the basis of August, l
Description Number Rate of Gross Annual Lease Payment
Net
of
Rental 1970 Rental
Due
of
Rental Due
Houseboat
Boats Per Week Available
Lentz 40% Bullfrog
44-foot
34-foot

l

2

$464.00
$408.00

$11,600.00
$20,400.00

$4,640.00 $6,960.00
$8,160.00 $12,240.00

TOTALS:

3

$872.00

$32,000.00

$12,800.00 $19,200.00

Damages projected for 25-wcek period on the basis of approved tariff:
Net
Description Number Rate of Gross Annual Lease Payment
of
of
Rental
1970 Rental
Due Lentz Rental Due
Houseboat Boats Per Week Available
40%
Bullfrog
41-foot
34-foot

1
2

$495.00
$415.00

$13.375.00
$20.750.00

$5,350.00
$8,300.00

$8,025.00
$12,450.00

TOTALS

3

$910.00

$.34,125.00

$13,650.00 $20.475.00

This Court may further consider in calculating damagr,s
that there could have been slightly less than full utilization of
reservation weeks over the entire 1970 season. Damage'
could therefore be determined to be 85 to 95 percent of the
above amounts.
The Court awarded nothing for the conversions of the
possessory interest in the leased houseboats! An award of
damages in an amount of either $19,200.00 or $20,475.00
for loss of rentals is
The Court should also award
a sum in penal damages for the wilfull violation of the contract and conversion.
The trial court refused to award attorney's fees thereby
again substituting its judgment and terms for the Agreement
of the parties. The provision of the parties for the attornc)
fee is clear, definite and enforceable.

26

by defaulting in the performance of the agreerefusing to allow Bullfrog to retain its contractual
' interest has severely damaged Bullfrog and the
s entitled to its full measure of damage. One elehose damages as provided in the contract is attorney
vhich should be determined by this Court.
i

he conclusion of the trial the Plaintiff tendered tess to attorney fees and the counsel for both parties
I that the Court could later receive evidence on
e attorney's fees in should the Court determining to
torney 's fees (T-297). This Court should determine
nt of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded Bulluant to the Agreement or remand the matter back
strict Court for hearing evidence on the amount of
s fees and for an award of reasonable attorney's fees
t therewith.
POINT III

OMPUTATION OF THE AMOUNT OF CONSIDlON DUE BULLFROG UNDER THE EMPLOYCONTRACT MUST BE RECALCULATED TO
ORM TO THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
lSIONS.

entered into an Employment Contract with
providing that employment commenced May 19,
ior to the execution of the written agreement the
ad operated under an oral agreement, the terms of
ere substantially the same as the written agreement
h merged the oral agreement into the written agree·
nding No. 11, R-129)

Employment Contract employs the Defendant to
he Houseboat Division of Bullfrog's business at Lake
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Powt'll and providt's ac- a11 i11c('11ti\t' t·o111rn1,.;,.;1on a portion ol
tlH' 11cl i11t'ollll' of thl' ho11,.;d1oat op<'ratio11. \ 111i11i111urn
wa,.; agrt'!'d to lw paid a,; an advarl<'<' again,;! a<'nt1ing int·t·ntiir
<·omrnissions (Paragraph "'\li11in1111n \\'ag<'" of \ppendi\ L).
Tltt' ·\gr<'l'tlH'lll further providt's for <'<'rlain d11li<',.; of rcrnrd
k<'t'ping, ,.;landard,.; of operation and for lt'rmi11ation 11po 11
two Wt'l'b' noti<'c ( \ppt'11di\. C).
ln determining Ill<' incenti\c t·o111rn1ss1on payablt' lu
Lentz. tilt' t'onlrat:I providl's for deduction of cost,; uf till'
ho11,.;!'boat opcrat ion frurn tlH' incomt'.
The partie,.; revi!'wed the t·onlr:wl 011 ,.;t'ITral o<·r·a,.1011·
brfor<' it wa,.; finally <'\.<'t'Uled. IL i,.; signif'i<'a11l lo nolt' that
lh<' only intnlint'alio11 in Lilt' Employ nl<'nt Conlracl is in th1·
S<'dion t'nlillcd. ''lrH·t·11tiv<' Cornmis,.;ion," wltne th<' pniod
for paym<'nl of !hi' t·ornmi,.,,.;io11 was shortt'rlt'd and a11 allo11·
of an arliitran ovnht'ad a111u11nl 11as clirninalt'd
Apprndi\. C).
\ltho11gh the \gre<'mcnl provided that il could be suli·
mil led lo the l\Jational Park
for approval, ncitlm
party rnadc such a submission. Tltt' parlic,.; t·ontinucd lo ad
11ndcr the contract until the date Lentz cancelled the sanrl'.
(T-16, 17. Exhibit 11) It i" apparrnl that tht' parties wai1rd
t·ornpliarn·t• with this provision of tlw contract and eln:tcrl In
procct'd under Ill<' olht'r term,;. \Jany t·a,.;t•s ,.;upporl this inter·
prdation of !ht' actions of lilt' parties, ind11ding thi,.; Court.

22,

In /1 h rerull us. Hu/Jliilt, I I<) l tah 16:),AP. :!cl. :!%.
(I 9SJ) this Court in a per cnriam opinion 11 rill<'n ll\ tltr
llonorablc J11slic<' Crockt'll, held al page
1

:.w

,

,,

... (A) party to a contract who is entitled to
dcr!rnnrl
of a condition precedent, may
waive_ the s_ame, either expressly or by acts evidencing
such mtentwn; and performance of a condition precedent to taking effect of a contract may be waived by the
acts of the parties in treating the agreement as in effect. ''
Tlw Court upheld the trial court in finding that if there
any condition precedent to the performance of the subjt'!:t contract, the condition was waived by the parties by
performing under the contract as if the condition was not in
See also California Raisin Growers' Assocation vs.
lbl1otl, 160 Cal. 601, 117 P. 767, (1911).
In Hein vs. Fox, 126 '\lontana 514, 254 P. 2d. 1076,
( 1952), a case similar to the issues presented in this case, the
Court found that the parties waived, through their performance, a provision in the contract that approval of a
government agency was required before performance. The
parties proceeded with the contract without ever submitting it
lo the government agency. The Court held:

" ... The approval by the agency was a condition
precedent to the actual carrying out of the contract and
ceased to be such by reason of the waiver.

A waiver may be by mere voluntary expression of
waiver and nearly always by continuing to render performance or by receiving further performance from the
other party, with knowledge that the condition has not
been performed. 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 755, p. 918.
Then, too, where a party enters into a contract
knowing that permission of government officers will be
required during the course of performance, that such
permission was not forthcoming when required does not
constitute an excuse for nonperformance .... "
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In his accountings to his employer Lentz 1lid not provide any supporting data, documcnts or any other methods
whereby Bullfrog could verify the accounts of Lentz and
Bullfrog had to rely on the figures developed and reported by
Lentz. Bullfrog's accountant found that under the Employment Contract terms Lentz had improperly determined the
amounts due and substantially overpaid himself (T-124-126.
Exhibit 14 ).
The contract required Lentz to prepare the submit
quarterly accountings of the houseboat operation to Bullfrog
so that Bullfrog could determine the commissions due Lentz
and the results of the houseboat operation. Lentz devised his
own method of bookkeeping. Lentz submitted reports on a
monthly basis but submitted the reports on an extremely
delayed basis (See Page 5 above).
The Employment Contract concisely and plainly states
the method by which Lentz' incentive commission is to be
determined. Lentz is entitled to a commission of 80% of the
net income of the houseboat operation. Net income is defined in the Contract:
"Net income shall be determined by deducting from
the gross income all costs and
of the operation
of the houseboat rental service .... All wages and commissions paid or due during the period will be considered as costs" (Appendix C).
Plaintiff's Certified Public Accountant testified that it
was his opinion under the plain terms of the contract the
commissions payable Lentz were deductible as a cost in arriving at net im:ome in that they are "wages and commissions"

(T-99).
The incentive comm1ss10n calculation requlfes use of
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own amounts which are dependent upon each
type of calculation is not unusual and may be
vo methods:
1

algebraic formula of simultaneous equations, or

' manual arthmetic computation by trial and error
ted In Prentice-Hall tax reference (T-121).
-og's Certified Public Accountant determined
mmission by the arithmetic computation. The
a standard recognized computation provided in the
ccounting service and authorities (T-121).

rog's accountant reviewed the Contract and operues submitted by Lentz and prepared an account
boat operation and determined the amounts due
md the proper incentive commission due Lentz
bit 14). The account indicated that there was a subnount due Bullfrog of $5,758.40 above the amount
ad already received (T-125, 126).

trial court refused to accept construction of the
1s written. The Court accepted the accounting proDefendant, (Exhibit 52), in spite of two mistakes by
intant in making wrong credits to Bullfrog, adding
credits to the accounts.

Court found the Defendant owed Bullfrog the sum
.88, which figure was later reduced to $3,703.00
n granting the reduction the Court considered and
he Defendant's accounting.

mony developed upon cross-examination of Lentz
four rental receipts for the summer of 1969, which
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w<'rt' rccievcd by Lentz but unrqrnrled lo Bullfrog. Lentz
rrndcrcd an additional aceounling al trial during his tPstirnony reporting two of llw rental (Exhibit l\Jo. 12).
of the lateness of the receiving of the evidence Plaintiff al'countanl was not able lo consider the additional 1111rcported
income in his accounting and the amount due Bullfroa hi
" .
Lt>nlz would be increased by the unreported amounts. The
unrqwrlcd reservations are as
Transcript
Page Number

Name of
Reservation

32& :n
32 & 33
60 & 75

Dr. Willis Taylor

61

l:lolwrt White
Steiner

Zt-nger

Exhihit No.

IO

10

8

(month of June)

Amount of
Reservatior.
Not Reported

$318.78
$318.78
£ 6S.7S

9

(month of July)

TOTAL:

$985.46

Plaintiff's accountant testified that if any additional in·
come of the houseboat operation who produced that Bullfrog
would be entitled to 1H% of such unreported income based
on the experience of the division for the 1969 season. -1-45( of
the unreported income ($9B5.46) is $433.60, and
amount should be added to the total due Bullfrog

(T-113-l lS).
In considering the accounting problem it is very impor·
tant to note that Mr. Lentz had total control uf all receipts of
the Houseboat Division and therefore Bullfrog must rely upon Mr. Lentz' rq)()rtcd income and the additonal income
dist:ovcrcd during trial.

The primary
for the termination of the Emplot
rnent Contract by Lenlz was the fad that Rullfrog was in·
siting on controlling tlw ren·ipts and more careful account-

ability and insisted on controlling the advertising (T-50-52).
Since Lentz terminated the Contract and since Bullfrog
must rely on Mr. Lentz admissions of income, is it not equitable that Bullfrog should at the minimum be entitled to payment in accordance with the contract terms? A judgment
based on Mr. Lentz' accounts and adjusted to reflect evidence
would be in the amount of:
Amount due Bullfrog as per account:
44% of Unreported income:

$5,758.40
433.60
$6,192.00

TOTAL:
together with interest from October, 1969.
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CONCLUSION
Not only arc the contracts clear and unambiguous, they
are supported by the evidence. Even the Defendant, Lent;,
did not testify as to the terms and conditions of any other,
contracts. There is no evidence of any contracts other than
the written contracts!
Even if there had been sufficient oral testimony from
which the Court could have constructed a new contract,
nevertheless, the court should have been hesitant to so do for
such testimony would necessarily have eminated from
Lentz; and the record shows that Mr. Lentz' testimony is not
reliable as indicated by the following conflicts:
A. Mr. Lentz claimed that he had furnished a full
accounting, and yet under cross examination it wa'
determined that he had received and no accounted for
payments from W. Robert White, Dr. F. Willis Taylor,
Mr. Steiner and Mr. Zenger (T-33-36, 66, 67, 98, 101).
On having these matters develop on cross examination
and other evidence, Mr. Lentz indicated the items had
been inadvertently omitted.
B. Lentz testified that after he had terminated the
contracts he had received no references for reservations
through the Bullfrog office. The Plaintiff produced a
witness, Mr. Staub, who completely contradicted Mr.
Lentz' statement (T-225-231).

C. Although '.\fr. Lentz unequivocally stated al the
beginning of the trial that he had a National Park Ser·
vicf' approved contract at Wahweap, Lake Powell, he
stipulated at the conclusion of the trial that such a state·
rnent was incorrect. (T-26, 28B, 289).

Since the parties developed and negotiated their contracts over an extended period of time and thereafter caused
the same to be reduced to writing and subscribed the con·
tracts, they should be bound by said contracts.
The plain, uncontradicted facts are that the Defendant,
Lentz, violated the lease contract and converted Bullfrog's
possessory interest in the houseboats. The value of the possessory interest so converted is best represented by the revenue that would have accrued during the remainder of the
term and since voluminous evidence is available to support
such rentals, Bullfrog should be awarded Judgment for the
value of the converted interest.
The Lease Agreement provided that the defaulting party
would pay reasonable attorney's fees. There is no question in
the evidence that the Defendant, Lentz, defaulted and as a
result precipitated this legal action and Plaintiff is entitled to
the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in bringing this action.
The Defendant, Lentz, was actually outside the State of
Utah at the date the action was commenced and the attachments were issued and had, at that time, listed his permanent
residence as the State of California. Therefore, Plaintiff is
entitled to its costs incurred in relation to such attachments.
With relation to the Employment Contract, the Plaintiff, without question, should be entitled to its portion of the
income that was newly discovered at the trial. The primary
differcme between the accounting developed by the. Defendant and the accounting developed by the Plaintiff is that in
tht> Plaintiff's accounting the salary and commission paid to
the Defendant, Lentz, is considered as an expense, whereas in
the Lentz accounting this expense is not considered. The
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plain wording of the contract requires that the salary and
commission paid to Defendant be deducted as an expense in
computing the net income of the houseboat operation and,
therefore, that the accounting prepared by the Plaintiff, adjusted to reflect after-discovered income, is the accounting
that should be adopted by the Court.
The Defendant, Lentz, willfully and maliciously converted personal property of the Plaintiff; and the Plaintiff..
Bullfrog, is entitled to not only the reasonable value of the
converted article but for damages for the conversion. Otherwise, the law would encourage the unlawful conversion of
property of others.
The parties, after considerable negot1at10n, reduced
their agreements to writing. The Plaintiff is entitled to the
enforcement of the provision of the writings. If this is not so,
it is of no purpose for people to hire attorneys and reduce
their agreements to writing, for they then do a fruitless and
wasteful thing.
Respectfully submitted,
BIELE, JONES, MURPHY & HASLAM
and W. JEFFERY FILLMORE
Attornies for Bullfrog Marina, Inc.
Plaintiff and Appellant
72 East Fourth South, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX A
SALM v. KRIEG (KREIG).
Columbia County Court.
July 25, 1944.

[ 49 N. Y. S.

C:ONNOR, Judge.

* * *
(New York> 194+)1

This decision involves the constitutionality of section
916 of the Civil Practice Act, as amended by the Laws of
19-40, c. 625. The particular question involved has never
heen passed upon by the courts of the State since the amendment. ...
. . . [2] Carmody's New York Practice, Volume7,page
383, discussing this subject, states: "It is necessary, in discussing non-residence as a ground for attachment, to keep in
mind the distinction between domicile and residence.
Domicile is the place where a person intends eventually to
return and thereto remain, while residence comprehends no
more than a fixed abode for the time being, as distinguished
from a place of temporary sojourn. The word 'residence'
means the abode or place where one actually lives. It implies
an established abode fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, although there may be an intent existing all the while to return to the true domicile. Residence in
thf' sense of the attachment provisions is not legal domicile,
but actual place of abode, temporary or permanent, at which
servire of process may be lawfully made. A person may have
a domicile in this state, but for attachment purposes, be a
non-resident, if he actually resides elsewhere."
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LOEW'S, Inc. v. DORSEY.
Suprt>nw Court, Special Term, '\Jew York County. Part J.
'.\1arch 27, l 9SO.

* * *
[ 96 N. Y. S. .315", (New York, 19so')

J

Action by Loew\; Incorporated against James F. Dor
st>y. wherein defendant moved to set aside warrant of attach
mcnt issued on ground that he was a non-resident of state.
Special Term, Eder, ]., held that the record t·stalili.<hcd that
defendant had a residence within the stale al which service of
process could be lawfully made at time of issuance of attachment. ...

. . . r1I

The test of residence u ndcr the attachment
statue is actual place of abode. whether temporary or permanent, ZcnatcUo v. Pons, 23.S App. Div. 221. :2.56 "· YS
763, 76.5. "Residrnce" means li,·ing in a particular localit1:
residence simply requires bodily presence in a givt>n pla<'t'.
Matter of Ncwcomc's Estatt-'., 192
:z:rn, B4 ;';.E. fJ."ill:
"residence". a,; usnl in section
C.P.-\ .. means not kgal
domicile. but actual place of abode or living. either of a
temporary or permanent character, al which a service of
process may be lawfully made. Wolf v. \linton, Sup., :17
N. Y .S.2d 294, 29.5 ....
\lJGUSTllS CO., for Use of BOURGEOIS,
et al. v. i\IANZELLA.
Circuit Court of 'lcw Jersey, Altantic
Cou ntv.
December 27, 1940.

[ 17 A. 2cl. 62>, (New

\)

Jer.sey, \9401

JAYNE, Circuit Court Judgt-'..
The aim of this proceeding is to nullify the issuance ofa
writ of atla!'hm!'nt. It is a:-;scrtcd that the writ was irn-

:3B

providrntly granted. The writ was issued on July 26, 1940,
l11 tht' derk of the County of Atlantic in consequence of an
affidavit declaring that the above-named defendant was inddited to the plaintiffs and that the debtor was not then a
rc;;idrnt in this State. R.S. 2:42-5, subd. b, N. J.S.A. 2:42-5,
'llhd. b....

. . . 15-8 J Many serviceable precepts can be extracted
lrom thest" decisions. Videlicet, mere presence in the State is
not
Evans v. Perrine, supra. Mere absence is not
proof of nonrcsidcnce. Leonard v. Stout, supra. Mere incon1cni1·rnT in the service of summons or other process furnishes
110 reason for the issuance of an attachment against one as a
nomcsident debtor. Stafford v. Mills, supra. A creditor need
nut wait for a nonresident debtor to enter this state, although
1t i;; known that the debtor frequently does so. Hackettstown
lfank v. l\litchell, supra; Evans v. Perrine, supra. The time
whrn the writ was issued and utilized is the time as of which
tlw residence of the debtor is material. Baldwin v. Flagg,
'llpra.
[<J J Justice Depue stated in Baldwin v. Flagg, supra:
··Pmine ads. Evans in this court ([35 N.J.L. 221) 6 Vroom
221) and Stout v. Leonard in the Court of Errors ([37 N.J.L.
+92], B \'room 492) have placed this subject on a rational
ba,;i,. A debtor may have his domicile in another state, and
1ct be exempt from process of attachment in this state. He
may he in the habit of coming into this state so frequently
and openly, that a creditor by watching an opportunity, may
obtain personal service of process upon him, and still he will
be liable to process of attachment. A residence or place of
<1bodt' in this state of a temporary or permanent character, at
which a summons might lawfully be served, is the condition
on which process of attachment cannot be issued. If the
1lchtor has not such a place of abode that a summons could
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be served at it, he is a non-resident with the meaning of the
statue, and may be proceeded against by attachment." Thi,
have been the authoritative test to which such problems haw
been uniformly subjected. See Coles & Sons Co. v. Blvtlw.
supra; Hisor v. Vandiver, supra; Missel! v. Hayes, supra .. ·..
JARRELL v. LEEPER. (No. 173.)
Supreme Court of Arkansas. October 15, l 928.

[ 9 5.w. 2d. 788, ( A.. Kansas,

J

... HART, C. J. (after stating the facts as above). [1]
The principal ground relied upon for a reversal of the jurlg
ment is that the defendant was not a nonresident of the stair
of Arkansas at the time the attachment was sued out. Thr
question of residence is a mixed one of law and fact. If. a'
contended by the defendant, the undisputed evidence show;
that he was a resident of the state of Arkansas at the time tht'
attachment was sued out, the finding of the court on tht
attachment branch of the case must be reversed.

,
1·

·
,/
'

I

[ 2] What constitutes a nonresident, within the meanini
of our attachment law, was considered and thoroughly rliicussed in the case of Krone v. Cooper, 43 Arkansas 547. The
court recognized that the words "resident" and "non·
resident," as used in our statute relating to attachments, had
never been defined by this court, and that no exact defini·
tion, which will fit all cases, is practical. The court recognized
that domicile has a broader meaning than residence, and in·
eludes residence. In discussing the question the court said:
"No word, it is said, is more nearly synonymous
with domicile than home, and it is generally agreed that
a man can have but one home or domicile, but that he
may have more than one place of residence. The domi·
cile of a citizen may be in one state, and his actual
residence in another. Savage v. Scott, 45 Iowa, 130:
Broad v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 197. Drake, in his work on

1

:

!

i

I
'
I
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se?tion 58, says: 'In determining whether
a de?tor 1s _a
of a particular state, the question
of his domicile 1s not necessarily involved, for he may
have a residence which is not in law his domicile.' "
At the conclusion of the discussion Chief Justice Cockrill said:
We may conclude from the cases that, in contemplation of the attachment laws generally, residence implies an established abode, fixed permanently for a time
for business or other purpose, although there may be an
intent existing all the while to return at some time or
other to the true domicile; but so difficult is it found to
provide a definition to meet all the varying phases of
circumstance that the determination of this question
may present that the courts say that, subject to the
general rule, each case must be decided on its own state
of facts."
The subject was also thoroughly discussed and the same
conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
Keller v. Carr, 40 Minn. 428, 42 N. W. 292, Mr. Justice
Mitchell, speaking for the court, said:
" 'Residence' and 'domicile' are not to be held
synonymous. 'Residence' is an act. 'Domicile' is an act
coupled with an intent. A man may have a residence in
one state or country, and his domicile in another, and
he may be a nonresident of the state of his domicile, in
the sense that his place of actual residence is not there.
Hence the great weight of authorities hold-rightly so, as
we think-that a debtor, although his legal domicile is in
the state, may reside or remain out of it for so long a
time, and under such circumstances, as to acquire, so to
speak, an actual nonresidence, within the meaning of
the attachment statute .... "

41

APPENDIX B

LUSE AGHEllfNT

c(JJr

ptJA

Gilbert M. Lentz., hereinafter ref&f'Ted to as

Lessor, and Bullfrog Basin, Inc., hereinafter referred tam Bullfrog, Leuee
in consideration of the covenants and conditions hereinafter

contained, agree as folloW$:

REPRESENTAJIONS
Bullfrog c1es;res to lease the follow;ng dotcdbed

houseboats:
I.

,H'" o../5Etk,.,...

eo1H1'E'-

w, -,.-,.,.

t'o.-.,rJL

If- I

,,er

L, ,o/,-;

/'",-J#f"/'f

£,,.n:;r</c:

2.

Jfo.__sr.le>,,,,...,..

3.y ..

;C"r

;:1..

£,.,c ,'µI'

J.

#v--Sted<',,,._,
<..v

'"

;y ",7.

7-N

£ 1,-.

4.

5.

6.

from le550r and on completion of term to return the ID,...
Bullfrog represents that it has no experience in the
rental of houseboats at ih norina location and does not want to lease

the same on o fixed rental basis but rather on a use or utility basis.

BIELE

"'

&. MUAPMY

,.ouh• "TPHT

""LfLA"'('TfVH"

"4111
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<

/l• £,.,,,t::.

the houseboab above

lessor represents

some to Bullfrog on a use or utility

described, is willing

basis and under the terms of this agreement.
7rf€

7£""'-'I
o.<.£

/f'A.

·"< U
t'olf l'FA·•# t>/t 2- )'FdS
The ,term of this lease shall comrrence upon cleliv.-y

of at lea1t foow of the •ubjec!> to
Marina., Bullfroil Bmin,
3
Utah, but if at leastJoor of the subject boob are not delivered
within hoo months, the loa,. •hall be of no f..-ther force and effect.

J_ /

:v.

the houseboab •'-• detcribed.

-c\S/::J Upon delivery

/£../---

f'or the subject on a rronthly

¥0% .

,

·

Bullfroil bin, Utah,

fm

days aftw the close

:/,-cw--

the ftet r.-ital derived from the ...-

of each calendar

.'V..,E

of •id ho-beah. Ilw 11it Nriial slall be delaminad bt - t i n g

_:..9"'..,t'

.fmm SFPP rentals gfl tala?f dirH'I) •th ihul•lsle to ltw luowbli 1
,.,..,ml opem•i r •cl e11t .i •• 1rti1i-9 =eel ..... ....- .•;»ts" .mp

in gross rentals, reservgtjpn cb:m1es receiytd h•t

W.d ond ll&e fill bi didUtiwd hum Iha y:

11

mt

mntn!.

)f't

V,t'
_,,.f"

t-

/,,,;.-;(

a'ien

clmrg s 1elurnod Oi 1ebetes 01 1efun• oelCA116d lo cc•lone1S.

.

4

..f/'

MAINTENANCE
Lessor

that the wbject shall be in

seaworthy condition on delivery of the 1ame in water at Bullfrog Basin,

Utah, .......,,__ tbol

ill ·z' tni• •aid ho11•bonh in-'"

nrelilien including 1lw Purnisl1i11gs and ;wip•At

,.,..£,That so id houseboab willCkdCt·
be cleaned
·vc-A. y

engines used in connection therewith.

la•>
o" co"icion

M

·

h t lacer a

bieuk<t>wnsond

+mnge '8 the s kjeet t Id" ; P

-2-
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·

....U..,t'

·

., Ila 1isl of

"fme hnrm 1m1 fmm

;tf· ..

_.RT/' <"'

4

-

.•">

1 •

n

+=or

i" ralatio:: lhe:elo. ,

Bullfrog from the dote of receipt of the subject shall
m:1intain reasonable public liability insurance in protecting it and ih

agenh and employees from liability, direct or indirect that m:1y result
by reGIOn of

the OF*'ation of the boats or casualty to individuals or

property resu&-_from the operation of the boat. This insurance
does£nc1.- collision or damage ifllUl'Gl'lce to thesub(ect Itself,

••

IUC h co II mon a

nd do mage •insurance C119lnQ
L•
•
I
by .-..:.
mcunta ned

*'1
_.-.?JL.

GENERAL

Upon lwmlna lion of the

1-, the subject will

bo

cloliV99d to the 1 - at the Bullfn>g Basin and ...t bo NODVed from
the preml,.. within thirty

lJO) days fn>m twmination.

Bullfn>g moy put wch Insignia 1ign& and aclvortl1l"I
natorial on the subject

GI

It cloens •pprop-i•te.

Any party lnaching thi1 agrHment .... II pooy all
coots Including recnonablo a - y f - ao ,_,ltant fronuw lnciclont

to such lnach.
NOTICES AND PAYMENTS
All natie91 and pa>"'*'h ohould bo clotwmined
complete -

cloys after being placed in the U.ited Stai. Mell,

adG--..1 GI folloWI:
Giibert M. IAntz
532 K.nolngton Drlvo
Fillnaro, California 93015

Bullfn>g Bmin, Inc.

E. R. Dumke
231 Emt Fourth South

Salt l.ako City, Utah &4111

or 1uch other adchs m the partlOI .... II In writing clolignato.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the partl• have caUMd thl1
agrMmont to bo oacuted

GI

3/

of thl1

cloy of tlay, 1969.

9Ul.LFROG BASIN, INC.

-3eun.11:. J0Nll8
,,, -

•

MU .. P'MY

,OU..,.... •ovTM

-.Tl.AACCIT"l',VT......... .,
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APPENDIX C

EMPLOYIHNll CONRACT
Bullfrog Basin, Inc., EmploY"r, a corporotion, 0o.. •.
he,.inaftw ,..fen-ed to as Bullfrog and Gilbert M. Lentz., hereinafter

,.r.....i to as Employee,

-

I. E · ·:oul;iJ

as follows:

.......,

REPRESENTATIONS:
Employee desires to aparote for

a houteboat

rental tervlce and to be paid for mid tervice an amount directly related

to the pn>fits resulting m.m the ,.rvlce.
Bullfrog desires to employ the employee on an incentive
bo1i1, .haring Nt profits witft employee.

MINIMUM WAGE:
Employee will "-ep a strict account of oll ho1n de¥otecl

to his employment by emploY"r ond fwnlth the .,mo to emploY"r weekly.
Employer will pay to employee the minimum weekly -ue ollo-ble by law
for each -ek that employee ls subotontiolly awilable and de¥otlng major
time to this employment.

IMINTENl\NCE OF RECORD:
It thall be emplaY"91 prhM respoNlbillty to malnlaln

complete and strict accol.Wtting of all costs directly« incflr.ctly involved
in the operation, maintenance and conduct of the houseboat rental tervice,
includine cost of equipment and amortization thereof, and all receipts from
said service. Bullfrog will provide an area for the rraintentlnce of records

and such auistance and service as is nec.-:1ry. The records shall be at all
ti,,.s open and available to either party.

INCENTIVE COMMISSION:

)

s.'/:J.P .,,if:.</..

Within ten.ktOfdoys after tho end of each calendar
quarter or as to0n thereafter as employee hc11 compiled the necessary records,

employee shall be paid an incentive commiuion equal to 80% of the net
lneome For the calendar quarter.
Net incorN shCI II be determined by deducting From the
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"°"If

grou incorre all costs and expenses of the operation of the locuseboat
rental service. 1:osh a1 herein con1idered wi II be direct and indirect
co1ts, including, without limitation, rea10noble anortization of COits

of hoUMboat or If Bullfrog Is leasing the houseboat the I"""' cost for
the

SJIN•

and conwniulons paid or due during the period

All -

will be comldered

QI

cosbpnd 011 u1bilN1y ulluwa11ew of 15.., of the

••ti ef the P' igd fo· i• ,,.1 e

e:head ulk>wu:icw.

4--4

Emplo)'M shall ,,,.lntaln complete recordo at Bullfrog
Marl,.,, which records shall be awllablo la and under tho control of
Bullfrog. Emplo)'M acknawlodgos that he Is under the control and direction
of Bullfrog and that all rates and charves nado will be in occordanco with

the publlohod rates and charves of Bullfrog, oh:.
TERMINATION:
This - - t shall t-o an initial lwm of -

but ""'Y be 1wm1,.,19c1 For oa- by olthor party by a -

yo.o,

- k written

notice.

ea- for lwmi... tlon by Bullfrog shall be the failure of
omplo)'M la dwote his best onorvi.. la the perfwllllnc• of this controct,

poor public relations, falhn la follow - b l o _...al Bullfrog,

..,...cused aboonco !tom

_.it

and i,.,billty la -nobly inouro Bullfn>t

!tom llabllltleo that might result !tom the operation by the public of the
houseboats°' If tho Park S.vlco or any other ro.,.._tativo of the
Depor1-11t of Interior shall do""'nd the tennl,.,tion of this contract or

ea... by omplo)'M -uld be - b l e do""'ndo on
omplo- time or unncnonablo roslrlctlons in tho perfor""'nc• of _k,
It being undonlaad that the omplo)'M Is la in generol
al Bullfrog operations, failure of Bullfrog

""'"°II" this division

io provide at

least four (4)

ho-boats for rental, falhn la,,,...., paymenb due emplo)'M and failure
la P""'ido - b l o employment conditions.
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Bullfrog .... II nalnlaln -k.-i's co..,.....tlon and
Industrial d i - Insurance and provldo all payroll and acco..,tlng
..,.,Ices required by the chartw operotlon.

This ogree. .nt Is subject to tho Gf>PRMll of tho Parks
Se.vice of tho De...,-nt of lniwlor.

NOTICES AND PAYMENlS:
All notices and pa)'ll*>ll should bo dotwnnlned compla"'

-

da)'I aftw being plac..t In tho

Sia"" Mall, ............. as

follows:

Bullfrog lcaln, Inc.
E. R. Dunb
231 East Fourth South
Salt Lab City, Utah 84111

Giibert M. Lonta
532 Konsl"lllDn Drive
Fill ..... , C.llfomla 93015

or such other adchs as tho partl• .... II In writing doslp"'.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, tho parties haw couoed thl1

_

. .nt to bo

•-utM as of this ;Jj_ day of July, 1969, wllh

Olllploymont to c o - • of

/t

llA.LFROG BASIN, INC,
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APPENDIX D
The courts can look only at the instruments and construe them together in an attempt to determine the intent of
the parties and may not make any variances or changes in the
contract and the contract should be enforced where it is
definite and complete on its face. Strike vs. White, 91 Utah
170, 63 P. 2d. 600, (1936)
" ... To be taken together as evidencing the same
thing the two instruments must not only both relate to
the same transaction but they must have the same object. Gerdes vs. Omaha Home for Boys, 166 Neb. 574,
89 N.W. 2d. 849, (1958) at page 854.
The Court continued:
" ... Appellants speak of interpreting contemporan·
eous instruments as though they were one. The correct
doctrine in this regard means that if there is a provision
in one instrument affecting a provision of another, they
will be given effect as between the parties and all who
are charged with notice so that the whole agreement
actually made may be determined and effectuated. lt
does not mean that a provision of one document is im·
ported bodily. into another contrary to the intent of the
parties or the express provision of the latter. They may
be intended to be separate writings though made at the
identical time by the same parties and to provide for
entirely different things. The statement that contein·
poraneous instruments may be treated and interpreted as
one means only that this will be done when it will ef·
fectuate the intention and if the provisions of the .two
instruments if put together will not be
The court may not do violence to a complete, unamhig·
uous contract by consolidating it with another writing. if
the effect of doing so would be to avoid an essential
part of the contract. If contracts or writings are in effect
independent they should not be construed together even
48

though the same parties and the same subject matter
may be concerned. Two instruments relating to distinct
subjects or things should not be construed together to
determine the intent and transaction of the parties
though made at the same time and though they relate to
the same transaction because both must have the same
object in order to be taken together as evidencing the
same thing.
"The Courts cannot and should not remake contracts
for the parties." Hanscome vs. Coppinger supra. In East Mill
Creek Water Company vs. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159
P. 2d. 863, (1945), the Court refused to construe the terms
of a contract differently from the manner in which they were
written in the contract and stating that to do so would
" ... amount to making a contract for the parties rather than
construing the one they made, which is clearly not our prerogative."
"The Court cannot rewrite a contract for the parties or
force upon them one of its own making." Genola Town vs.
Santaquin City, 100 Utah 62, llO P. 2d. 1401, 1405, (1936)
and Elggren vs. Snyder, 75 Utah 370, 285 P. 640, 643,
(1930).
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